Case Studies

Illustrations of procurement mechanisms, not experiments or causal evidence. Calculator values come from the model and are not outcomes reported by these organizations.

Vehicle Fleet Procurement

Ryanair Fleet Procurement (private-sector example)

The annual report documents a large Boeing 737 order and manufacturer price concessions. It does not describe a comparable procurement workflow or identify an effect of flexibility; the scenario values are independent model assumptions.

Formal path

44 days

Strategic private purchase — formal tender (RFQ/RFP)

Adaptive path

24 days

Partial ERP

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -0.8% to 13.2% of contract value.

Source: Ryanair 2002/2003 Annual Report / SEC Form 20-F (Boeing price concessions)

IT/ERP Contract

Swiss Casinos ERP — Agile Sourcing (private-sector example)

An Agile Business Consortium practitioner report states that Swiss Casinos sourced its ERP in four weeks. This is a claim reported by an organisation promoting the method, not an independent study or the full implementation time.

Formal path

50.599999999999994 days

Strategic private purchase — formal tender (RFQ/RFP)

Adaptive path

27.599999999999994 days

Sourcing tool

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -0.1% to 36.8% of contract value.

Source: Agile Business Consortium — Case Study: Swiss Casinos (practitioner report)

Logistics Services

Air France KLM Martinair Cargo — Lean Agile Procurement (private-sector example)

Private-sector case: Air France KLM applied Lean Agile Procurement for cargo door-to-door modernisation within a tight time window. A practitioner example illustrating private-sector efficiency — not empirical evidence about public-procurement law.

Formal path

44 days

Strategic private purchase — formal tender (RFQ/RFP)

Adaptive path

24 days

Partial ERP

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -1.1% to 5.6% of contract value.

Source: LAP Alliance / Agile Business Consortium (2021) — Air France KLM Martinair Cargo case study (practitioner example, illustrative)

Production Materials

Zara — Responsive Fast-Fashion Supply Chain (illustrative)

Ferdows, Lewis and Machuca describe Zara's responsive supply network. This is an operations and supply-chain case, not evidence for a procurement method or for replacing tenders with AI.

Formal path

61.599999999999994 days

Strategic private purchase — formal tender (RFQ/RFP)

Adaptive path

33.599999999999994 days

Manual (Excel / email)

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -0.1% to 65.6% of contract value.

Source: Ferdows, Lewis & Machuca, HBR (2004) — Rapid-Fire Fulfillment (illustrative example)

Tunnel vs Field

Tunel vs Pole — ten sam zakup, dwa światy

Two lawful designs for the same procedure: more sequential and more adaptive. The result depends on delay cost, competition, and contract design; it does not assume an exemption from PZP.

Formal path

87 days

Strategic PZP — open tender (above EU thresholds)

Adaptive path

71 days

Partial ERP

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -0.8% to 20.3% of contract value.

Source: Konstrukcja modelu 2.2 — scenariusz ilustracyjny bez źródła zewnętrznego. Wartości wejściowe są założeniami, a nie danymi z żadnego badania.

CAPEX Investment

Ryanair CAPEX — Boeing bulk order at crisis prices (private-sector example)

The report documents a large Boeing order and price concessions, but not Ryanair's internal CAPEX gates, pre-qualification, or procurement-cycle time. This scenario illustrates the cost calculation and is not a reconstruction of Ryanair's process.

Formal path

120 days

Strategic CAPEX investment (justified governance)

Adaptive path

84 days

Partial ERP

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -1.0% to 21.9% of contract value.

Source: Ryanair 2002/2003 Annual Report / SEC Form 20-F (Boeing price concessions)

Stable purchase — control scenario

Scenariusz kontrolny: formalność może wygrać

When delay cost is negligible, the market is stable, and the formal path retains a competition advantage, the central result can favor formality. The broad stress test may still reverse the sign.

Formal path

13.999999999999998 days

Strategic purchase — adaptive and compliant path

Adaptive path

13.999999999999998 days

End-to-end (Ariba / Coupa)

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -0.9% to 1.4% of contract value.

Source: Założenia scenariuszowe ProcuraCost 2.1 — nie obserwacja empiryczna

Discovery purchase — requirement unknown

Scenariusz kontrolny II: adaptacja bywa droższa

When the requirement emerges in flight, the adaptive path buys learning with time: co-design and a re-scoping round lengthen the calendar and raise effort. The formal path freezes the requirement early and finishes sooner, paying with a worse fit and weaker lifecycle capture. This scenario exists so the model's thesis can be refuted, not only confirmed.

Formal path

34 days

Strategic discovery purchase — requirement unknown at the outset

Adaptive path

47 days

Partial ERP

Day figures are illustrative model output for a purchase of this size, not the figures from the cited case.

ΔC range: -15.0% to 3.9% of contract value.

Source: Konstrukcja modelu 2.2 — scenariusz ilustracyjny bez źródła zewnętrznego. Wartości wejściowe są założeniami, a nie danymi z badania.

The Enforcement Fallacy

Organizational theory suggests mechanisms through which strict enforcement can displace effort or hide workarounds. Lipsky (1980), Vaughan (1996), and Holmström & Milgrom (1991) concern different settings; their application to procurement is analogical and does not establish a bypass probability or a universal causal effect.

Sources: Lipsky (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy; Vaughan (1996) The Challenger Launch Decision; Holmström & Milgrom (1991) Multitask Principal-Agent Problems and Incentive Contracts

Paweł Mamcarz
MK
MB
TS
RM
Procurement Collective